This paper develops a framework to analyze the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and the decentralization decisions of firms. Centralized control relies on the information of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information. Decentralized control, on the...

This paper introduces a labor force participation choice into a labor marketmatching model embedded in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium set-upwith production and savings. The participation choice is modelled as a tradeoffbetween forgoing the expected benefits of being search active and...

Many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of “kleptocrats”, who implement highly inefficient economic policies, expropriate the wealth of their citizens, and use the proceeds for their own glorification or consumption. We argue that the success of kleptocrats rests, in...

Why would two risk-average agents write a nominal contract? A possible answer is that for an agent who is subject to risks caused by price variability, a nominal contract that offers hedging against these risks may be optimal. This paper argues that nominal contracts may have a role in...

A General Equilibrium model of investment is constructed in which the pay-offs of firms depend on each other''s actions. It is shown that when these actions are unobservable but aggregate output is in the information set of the agents; it acts as a signal. The implication is that output will...

A competitive business cycle model is developed in which internal increasing returns translate a white noise random shock into temporarily agglomerated economic activity. Te qualitative nature of the economy varies over the cycle due to changes in the underlying economic structure, giving rise...