of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto … compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we …

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset … information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to … results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or …

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset … information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to … results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or …

This paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents can condition on noisy … information: a payoff (pecuniary) externality related to aggregate volatility and a learning externality. The impact of the first … little weight on private information. We find that with strategic substitutes and when the learning externality is not very …

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset … information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to … results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or …

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset … information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to … results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or …

information. We derive conditions under which pure herdingbehavior is to be expected. …

information. We derive conditions under which pure herdingbehavior is to be expected. -- creditor coordination ; global games …