We develop a theoretical model examining the financial stability policy of a central bank serving as both the lender of last resort and the regulator of the financial system. The model accommodates the possibility of financial contagion through interbank market linkages, and adverse feedback...

On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum coorganized a conference "Crisis management at cross-roads" in Brussels. All papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.

We examine the financial conditions of dealers that participated in two of the Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities -- the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) -- that provided liquidity against a range of assets during...

This paper models the role of the lender of last resort (LoLR) in a general equilibrium framework. We allow for heterogeneous agents and a risk-averse banking sector, and incorporate the frictions of endogenous default, liquidity, and money. Adverse supply shocks in monetary endowments trigger...

This paper develops a model of the lender of last resort. It provides an analytical basis for too big too fail and a rationale for constructive ambiguity. Key results are that if contagion (moral hazard) is the main concern, the Central Bank (CB) will have an excessive (little) incentive to...

This paper develops a model of the lender of last resort (LOLR). In a simple one-period setting, the Central Bank (CB) should only rescue banks which are above a threshold size, thus providing an analytical basis for "too big too fail". We also provide a rationale for "constructive ambiguity"....

We develop a model in which financial intermediaries hold liquidity to protect themselves from shocks. Depending on parameter values, banks may choose to hold too much or too little liquidity on aggregate compared with the socially optimal amount. The model endogenously generates a situation of...

During the last decades a consensus has emerged that it is impossible to disentangle liquidity shocks from solvency shocks. As a consequence the classical lender of last resort rules, as defined by Thornton and Bagehot, based on lending to solvent illiquid institutions appear ill-suited to this...

Recent funding problems experienced by European sovereigns and the subsequent policy actions taken by European authorities have renewed interest in the international Lender of Last Resort (LLR). This paper constructs a global game LLR model applicable to both domestic and international contexts,...

In the months preceding the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, banks were willing to pay a premium over the Federal Reserve's discount window (DW) rate to participate in the much less flexible Term Auction Facility (TAF). We empirically test the predictions of a new signalling model...