We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous `disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under...

Abstract: Die Selektion öffentlicher Bediensteter in die Politik ist ein weitverbreitetes, jedoch kaum verstandenes Phänomen. Einerseits generiert die starke Vertretung öffentlicher Bediensteter in der Politik Interessenkonflikte und weckt Bedenken bezüglich des Gewaltenteilungsprinzips....

The German Basic Law is open for an interpretation that would allow the Constitutional Court to test the normative adequacy of most statutes. If the court does, it could be modelled as the supervisor of the legislator, i.e., of the agent of the people. The model predicts collusion between the...

This article surveys the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status-quo. These are the legislative bargaining situations in which in each period a new policy is decided and the policy implemented in the event of no agreement is endogenously determined by the outcome...