Similar Search Results

To merge or not to merge: That is the question

Corchón, Luis; Fauli-Oller, Ramon - In: Review of Economic Design 9 (2004) 1, pp. 11-30

In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal mergers when the regulator is not informed about all … parameters that determine social and private gains from potential mergers. We show that implementation requires a certain degree …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753044

Pigouvian taxes: A strategic approach

Pérez, José Alcalde; Corchón, Luis; Jiménez, … - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 1996

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can be formed. Finally, we study economies in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008542862

An experiment on Nash implementation

Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary; Corchón, Luis - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1998

We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non … some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772110

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WALRASIAN CORRESPONDENCE BY MARKET GAMES

Corchón, Luis; Wilkie, Simon - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 1995

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515885

A DECENT PROPOSAL

Corchón, Luis; Blanco, Carmen Herrero - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 1995

In this paper we explore the notion that players are decent, in the sensethat their choices are bound by certain unwritten social rules. We apply thisidea to two cases: bankruptcy and bargaining in exchange economies. Wecharacterize the results that are generated by such a behavior in the cases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515932

A decent proposal

Corchón, Luis; Herrero, Carmen - In: Spanish Economic Review 6 (2004) 2, pp. 107-125

unwritten social rules. We apply this idea to problems of Bankruptcy and Implementation. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598194

Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach

Triossi, Matteo; Corchón, Luis - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2006

In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181142

- EXISTENCE AND NASH IMPLEMENTATION OF EFFICIENT SHARING RULES FOR A COMMONLY OWNED TECHNOLOGY.

Corchón, Luis; Puy, M. Socorro - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2000

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731204

THE THEORY OF IMPLEMENTATION WHEN THE PLANNER IS A PLAYER

Corchón, Luis; Baliga, Sandeep; Sjöström, Tomas - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 1995

messages announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation … problem into a signaling game. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for interactive implementation under different … restrictions on the planner's out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We compare our results to standard results on Nash implementation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731405