Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Staged financing of venture capital-backed firms is valuable to both investors and entrepreneurs, but comes with a potential cost: hold-up. With asymmetric information and strong control rights, financial intermediaries may earn rents on their inside knowledge. We find that environments where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864967
We provide novel evidence on voting practices used by the investment committees of prominent venture capital investors in the U.S. A substantial share of these VCs use a voting rule for seed and early stage investments where a single `champion' is sufficient for the entire partnership to make an...
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We study how technological shocks to the cost of starting new businesses have led the venture capital model to adapt in fundamental ways over the prior decade. We both document and provide a framework to understand the changes in the investment strategy of venture capitalists (VCs) in recent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453193
We study how technological shocks to the cost of starting new businesses have led the venture capital model to adapt in fundamental ways over the prior decade. We both document and provide a framework to understand the changes in the investment strategy of venture capitalists (VCs) in recent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012920902
We provide a model of investment into new ventures that demonstrates why some places, times and industries should be associated with a greater degree of experimentation by investors. Investors respond to financing risk ― a forecast of limited future funding ― by modifying their focus to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038644
Our paper demonstrates that while failure tolerance by investors may encourage potential entrepreneurs to innovate, financiers with investment strategies that tolerate early failure endogenously choose to fund less radical innovations. Failure tolerance as an equilibrium price that increases in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013035138
Our paper demonstrates that while failure tolerance by investors may encourage potential entrepreneurs to innovate, financiers with investment strategies that tolerate early failure endogenously choose to fund less radical innovations. Failure tolerance as an equilibrium price that increases in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459282