This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we … develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other … that altruism undermines the credibility of a threat of dismissal but strengthens the credibility of a bonus. Among others …

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To … this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward …, while worse social relationships may increase productivity and players' utility in equilibrium. -- altruism ; spite ; social …

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To … this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward …

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To … this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward …

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To … this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward …

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To … this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward …

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To … this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward …

This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we … develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other … that altruism undermines the credibility of a threat of dis- missal but strengthens the credibility of a bonus. Among …