We study a dynamic mean-variance portfolio optimization problem under the reinforcement learning framework, where an entropy regularizer is introduced to induce exploration. Due to the time-inconsistency involved in a mean-variance criterion, we aim to learn an equilibrium strategy. Under an...

Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient...

Maxmin or minmax optimization problems arise in many applications. There is a classical connection between these problems and zero-sum games. This paper shows that, under certain conditions, maxmin solutions also arise from Nash equilibria of population games as studied in evolutionary game...

In this paper, we continue our study on a general time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) control problem originally formulated in Hu, Jin and Zhou (2012). We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium controls via a flow of forward-backward stochastic differential...

We characterise the entire set of symmetric stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPE) in a differential game of public good investment, using the canonical problem of climate change as an example. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for MPE and show how the entire set of MPE is...

We characterise the entire set of symmetric stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPE) in a differential game of public good investment, using the canonical problem of climate change as an example. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for MPE and show how the entire set of MPE is...

This paper uses the example of an exam to model multi-dimensional search under a deadline. When the dimension is two, an order-invariance property allows simple characterization of the optimal search policy. Behavior is shown to be highly sensitive to changes in the deadline, and a wide variety...

In this paper we study a two-player investment game with a first mover advantage in continuous time with stochastic payoffs, driven by a geometric Brownian motion. One of the players is assumed to be ambiguous with maxmin preferences over a strongly rectangular set of priors. We develop a...