Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 522
Cover Image
Preemption in Capacity and Price Determination : A Study of Endogenous Timing of Decisions for Homogeneous Markets
Güth, Werner; Gueth, Sandra - 2021
Endogenous timing can help to derive the time structure of decision making instead of assuming it as exogenously given. In our study we consider a homogeneous market where, like in the model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), sellers determine sales capacities before prices. Sellers must serve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321105
Cover Image
Dynamic decision structure and risk taking
Eichberger, Jürgen; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland - 1999
This paper investigates the behaviour in repeated decision situations. The experimental study shows that subjects show low or no risk-aversion, but put very high value on the opportunity to sell the lottery in every stage of the decision problem. There is evidence that risk attitudes depend on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582412
Cover Image
Zur strategischen Analyse von Verhandlungssituationen : die nichtkooperative Theorie der Verhandlungen
Güth, Werner - In: Beiträge zur angewandten Mikroökonomik : Jochen …, (pp. 193-221). 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001288127
Cover Image
Sorting via screening versus signaling : a theoretic and experimental comparison
Güth, Werner; Winter, Fabian - 2013
Similar to Kübler et al. (2008, GEB 64, p. 219-236), we compare sorting in games with asymmetric incomplete information … capture the structural difference of screening and signaling only via their payoff specification. The experiment thus relies … equilibrium play due to sorting under signaling, compared to screening, is predicted and confirmed experimentally. -- off …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009736798
Cover Image
Verstehen, Verständigen, Vertrag : Ökonomik als Geistes-, Natur- und Staatswissenschaft
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Wangenheim, Georg von - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003376012
Cover Image
Verstehen, Verständigung, Vertrag : Ökonomik als Geistes-, Natur- und Staatswissenschaft
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Wangenheim, Georg von - In: Wirtschaftwissenschaften zwischen Markt, Norm und Moral …, (pp. 35-62). 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003722792
Cover Image
Sorting Via Screening Versus Signaling : A Theoretic and Experimental Comparison
Güth, Werner; Winter, Fabian - 2013
Similar to Kübler et al. (2008, GEB 64, p. 219-236), we compare sorting in games with asymmetric incomplete information … capture the structural difference of screening and signaling only via their payoff specification. The experiment thus relies … to signaling, off the equilibrium play is predicted and confirmed experimentally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014039063
Cover Image
Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions: Experimental evidence
Burda, Michael C.; Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1998
One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don't employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983862
Cover Image
Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions: Experimental evidence
Burda, Michael C.; Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - 1998
One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don't employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010309895
Cover Image
Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions : experimental evidence
Burda, Michael C.; Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - 1998 - Rev.
One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don’t employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578579