. We approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non …-pay auction and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the … anomaly. First, participation in the all-pay auction is substantially lower than in the other mechanisms while the average …

This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …

approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary … contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In contrast to the VCMs, households competed for a prize in the all-pay auction … and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the laboratory …

This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …

-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …

laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English … auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly reject our theoretical prediction that the English auction leads to less … aggressive bids and fewer bankruptcies than the first-price sealed-bid auction. <I>X</I>-cursedness gives a robust explanation of …

argues that these inefficiencies can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any public payment they … the auction itself takes place. …

constrained bidders. Succeedingly we propose an ascending auction mechanism that always results in an equilibrium allocation and … underdemanded set, or there is neither overdemand nor underdemand anymore. In the latter case the auction stops. In the former case …, precisely one item will be sold, the bidder buying the item leaves the auction and the auction continues with the remaining …