It is not unusual in real-life that one has to choose among finitely many alternatives when the merit of each alternative is not perfectly known. This may be the case when an individual chooses school, doctor or pension plan, or when a firm chooses between alternative R&D projects. Instead of...

The Pareto dominance relation is shown to be the unique nontrivial partial order on the set of finite-dimensional real vectors satisfying a number of intuitive properties. -- Pareto dominance ; characterization

Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices: salience, inertia, the formation of habits, the use of rules of thumb, or the locking in on certain modes of behavior due to learning by doing. This...

In t-solutions, quantal response equilibria based on the linear probability model as introduced in R.W. Rosenthal (1989, Int. J. Game Theory 18, 273-292), choice probabilities are related to the determination of leveling taxes. The set of t-solutions coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of...

In this paper we present a unit root test against a nonlinear dynamic heterogenous panel with each cross section modelled as an LSTAR model. All parameters are viewed as cross section specific. We allow for serially correlated residuals over time and heterogenous variance among cross sections....

In this paper we derive tests for parameter constancy when the data generating process is non-stationary against the hypothesis that the parameters of the model change smoothly over time. To obtain the asymptotic distributions of the tests we generalize many theoretical results, as well as new...

In this paper we derive a unit root test against a Panel Logistic Smooth Transition Autoregressive (PLSTAR). The analysis is concentrated on the case where the time dimension is fixed and the cross section dimension tends to infinity. Under the null hypothesis of a unit root, we show that the...

In a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses ro every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 403] relax this condition by only requiring the...