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Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers : Theory With an Application to Foreign Aid
Amegashie, J. Atsu; Ouattara, Bazoumana; Strobl, Eric - 2021
The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donor's choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317036
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Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid
Ouattara, Bazoumana; Amegashie, J. Atsu; Strobl, Eric - 2009
The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donor's choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010301489
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Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid
Amegashie, J. Atsu; Ouattara, Bazoumana; Strobl, Eric - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2007
The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donor’s choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005170666
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Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid
Ouattara, Bazoumana; Amegashie, J. Atsu; Strobl, Eric - Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für … - 2009
The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donors choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted transfers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008565020
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Moral hazard and the composition of transfers : theory with an application to foreign aid
Amegashie, J. Atsu (contributor);  … - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003473696
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Moral hazard and the composition of transfers : theory with an application to foreign aid
Amegashie, J. Atsu; Ouattara, Bazoumana; Strobl, Eric - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008904057
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Moral hazard and the composition of transfers : theory with an application to foreign aid
Amegashie, J. Atsu (contributor);  … - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003497729
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Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid
Amegashie, J. Atsu; Ouattara, Bazoumanna; Strobl, Eric - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donor’s choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005790190
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On the non-contractual nature of donor-recipient interaction in development assistance
Murshed, Syed Mansoob (contributor) - 2008
This paper analyses three issues in strategic donor-recipient interaction motivated by the complexity of the rationale underlying aid. The first is when we have several principals with conflicting objectives. Any one principal cannot offer high powered incentives to the agent to carry out their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793485
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On the non-contractual nature of donor-recipient interaction in development assistance
Murshed, S. Mansoob - 2008
This paper analyses three issues in strategic donor-recipient interaction motivated by the complexity of the rationale underlying aid. The first is when we have several principals with conflicting objectives. Any one principal cannot offer high powered incentives to the agent to carry out their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273524