We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. We show …-Palestinian conflict. We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics and their strategic value as … that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts. Surprisingly, in …

We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. We show …-Palestinian conflict. We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics and their strategic value as … that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts. Surprisingly, in …

This paper conducts the analysis of conflict and appropriation by extending the static contest models such as … long-run response to conflict. In particular, we find that a decrease in the effectiveness of appropriation, the …

This paper presents an extension of a static model of economic conflict analyzed by Hirshleifer (1991, 1995) and … “partial cooperation” can be seen as a long-run response to conflict. Moreover, a decrease in the effectiveness of …

We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding … something which has become impossible. The model offers insight on the relative importance of proposal power and commitment for …