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Would You Mind if I Get More? An Experimental Study of the Envy Game
Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358618
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Would you mind if I get more? An experimental study of the envy game
Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2012) 3, pp. 857-865
setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048077
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Would you mind if I get more? An experimental study of the envy game
Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - 2011
setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281655
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Would you mind if I get more? : an experimental study of the envy game
Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - 2011
setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict … and results in a considerable loss of efficiency. -- Social Preferences ; Conflict ; Experimental Economics ; Bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009374671
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Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Güth, Werner - 2010
Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, together with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267112
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Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits : an axiomatic approach
Güth, Werner - 2010
Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, together with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944203
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Trust in the Shadow of the Courts
Brennan, Geoffrey; Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 159 (2003) 1, pp. 16-16
Even if contract enforcers are as opportunistic as ordinary traders, a system of adjudication can increase the degree to which contractual obligations on large anonymous markets are fulfilled. Only if arbitrators receive a fixed income, occasional mistakes will not favour the untrustworthy. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823388
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Endogenous Price Leadership - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, … - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers can adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader then clears the market by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010695881
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Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism
Güth, Werner - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) C, pp. 389-395
A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness, we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116861
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Endogenous price leadership – A theoretical and experimental analysis
Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, … - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) C, pp. 420-432
We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader clears the market by serving the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116870