The paper considers a two-country model of overlapping generations economies with intergenerational transfers carried out in the form of bequest and investment in human capital. The authors examine in competitive equlibrium the optimal provision of education with and without capital markets...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct externalities between principals both under complete and asymetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other pricipal`s payoff....

In the context of common agency adverse-selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation pricipal - what we term the "delegation priciple" - can be used to...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presenting a general algorithm to find the pure -strategy equilibria of this game, we use it to characterize these equilibria when the two principals...

In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper the authors give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts they show that such may increase efficiency. They show that efficiency can be...