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The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence
Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010652413
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The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence
Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552254
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Enlargement and the Balance of Power: an Experimental Study
Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin; Zhang, Ping - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2005
voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule … this effect using laboratory experiments. Participants propose and vote on how to divide a budget according to weighted … majority voting rules, and we measure the voting power of a player by his average payoff in the experiment. By comparing voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010601967
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Enlargement and the Balance of Power: an Experimental Study
Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin; Zhang, Ping - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2005
voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule … this effect using laboratory experiments. Participants propose and vote on how to divide a budget according to weighted … majority voting rules, and we measure the voting power of a player by his average payoff in the experiment. By comparing voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005453699
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The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence
Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150918
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The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence
Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150923
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ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2010
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)’s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677997
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ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2009
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors, focusing on the simple quasi-linear setting with two players (Varian, 1994). We show that the move order that is predicted to emerge is sensitive to how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552263
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Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence
Gaechter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Renner, Elke; … - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2009
We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting. In one parameterization we find that overall provision is lower under sequential than simultaneous contributions, as predicted, but the distribution of contributions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552271
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Framing and Free Riding: Emotional Responses and Punishment in Social Dilemma Games
Cubitt, Robin P.; Drouvelis, Michalis; Gächter, Simon - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2008
In this paper, we report an experimental investigation of the effect of framing on social preferences, as revealed in a one-shot linear public goods game. We use two indicators to measure social preferences: self-reported emotional responses; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552272