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Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers

Cox, Caleb A.; Stoddard, Brock - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 394-412

We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709858

Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships

Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-16

We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously-formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual's: (1) opportunity to commit to their partner; (2) the cost of dissolving committed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709878

Anger management: Aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods

Gee, Laura K.; Lyu, Xinxin; Urry, Heather - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-28

The ability to punish free-riders can increase the provision of public goods. However, sometimes, the benefit of increased public good provision is outweighed by the costs of punishments. One reason a group may punish to the point that net welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709915

Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule

Funaki, Yukihiko; Li, Jiawen; Veszteg, Róbert F. - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-22

joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity … voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a … choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852718

To tender or not to tender? Deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game

Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1-28

In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227697

Dynamic contributions to a public project: The impact of rising marginal benefit and completion benefits

Baker, Ronald J.; Halloran, Matthew - In: Games 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1-19

contributions and condition additional contributions on the cooperation of others. This study presents results from experiments in …. Results reveal that when the multiple threshold design is combined with a completion benefit, overall contributions and … the multiple threshold design are not significantly different from a constant marginal benefit design. In addition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227699