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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010
interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287731
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Inherited institutions: Cooperation in the light of democratic legitimacy
Langenbach, Pascal; Tausch, Franziska - 2017
impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011662174
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Institutional endogeneity and third-party punishment in social dilemmas
Marcin, Isabel; Robalo, Pedro; Tausch, Franziska - 2016
situations in which the adoption of this institution is endogenously decided via majority voting to situations in which it is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522111
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Institutional endogeneity and third-party punishment in social dilemmas
Marcin, Isabel; Robalo, Pedro; Tausch, Franziska - 2016
situations in which the adoption of this institution is endogenously decided via majority voting to situations in which it is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455952
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Inherited institutions : cooperation in the light of democratic legitimacy
Langenbach, Pascal; Tausch, Franziska - 2017
impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011587713
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Communication in asymmetric group competition over public goods
Zhang, Jingjing - 2012
This paper examines whether and how cheap talk communication can facilitate within-group coordination when two unequal sized groups compete for a prize that is shared equally among members of the winning group, regardless of their (costly) contributions to the group's success. We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316824
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Self-Organization for collective action: An experimental study of voting on formal, informal, and no sanction regimes
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2011
). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287722
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Governing collective action in the face of observational error
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis G.; Wang, Liangjun - 2017
We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012058652
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Can endogenously chosen institutions mitigate the free-rider problem and reduce perverse punishment?
Ertan, Arhan; Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis - 2005
Previous experiments on public goods dilemmas have found that the opportunity to punish leads to higher contributions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318915
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Give everybody a voice! The power of voting in a public goods experiment with externalities
Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - 2014
We study the effect of voting when insiders´ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting …. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances contributions if outsiders are unaffected and internalizes the negative … externality by lowering contributions when outsiders are negatively affected. Remarkably, voting does not increase contributions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478914