experimental subjects are willing to pay a significant premium for the voting right even though there should be no such premium in … cannot explain the size of the observed voting premium. The premium disappears in treatments where voting has no material …

-proof mechanism if some agents are sincere. We use lab experiments to study the preferences of subjects for the Boston mechanism or …

for SD, but mainly when priorities are merit-based. Stated voting motives indicate that choosing SD is driven by concerns …

-proof mechanism if some agents are sincere. We use lab experiments to study the preferences of subjects for the Boston mechanism or …

for SD, but mainly when priorities are merit-based. Stated voting motives indicate that choosing SD is driven by concerns …

for SD, but mainly when priorities are merit-based. Stated voting motives indicate that choosing SD is driven by concerns …

experimental subjects are willing to pay a significant premium for the voting right even though there should be no such premium in … cannot explain the size of the observed voting premium. The premium disappears in treatments where voting has no material …

interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have … the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can … model of instrumental voting, which assumes that individuals are overconfident and that they overestimate the errors of …

for SD, but mainly when priorities are merit-based. Stated voting motives indicate that choosing SD is driven by concerns …