Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient … thresholds are ineffective at best and often counter-productive. This holds under a range of threshold levels and refund rates …. We test if thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum …

Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public-good game with an inefficient … thresholds are ineffective at best and often counterproductive. This holds over a range of threshold levels and refund rates. We … test whether thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e., whether a threshold is approved in a …

Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient … thresholds are ineffective at best and often counter-productive. This holds under a range of threshold levels and refund rates …. We test if thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum …

of tax shifting in the market. We show that tax salience biases consumers' voting on tax regimes, and that experience is …

of tax shifting in the market. We show that tax salience biases consumers' voting on tax regimes, and that experience is …

of tax shifting in the market. We show that tax salience biases consumers voting on tax regimes, and that experience is …

of tax shifting in the market. We show that tax salience biases consumers' voting on tax regimes, and that experience is … experience with the tax regimes they are less likely to be biased. -- tax salience ; learning ; deliberation ; voting …