This paper uses an integrated assessment model to quantify the climate R&D investment strategy for a variety of scenarios fully consistent with 2°C. We estimate the total climate R&D investment needs in approximately 1 USD Trillion cumulatively in the period 2010-2030, and 1.6 USD Trillions in...

This paper uses an integrated assessment model to quantify the climate R&D investment strategy for a variety of scenarios fully consistent with 2°C. We estimate the total climate R&D investment needs in approximately 1 USD Trillion cumulatively in the period 2010-2030, and 1.6 USD Trillions in...

This paper uses an integrated assessment model to quantify the climate R&D investment strategy for a variety of scenarios fully consistent with 2°C. We estimate the total climate R&D investment needs in approximately 1 USD Trillion cumulatively in the period 2010-2030, and 1.6 USD Trillions in...

The development of unconventional gas extraction has led to significant declines in gas prices, recently followed by a large drop of oil prices. This is also the year which is supposed to deliver the long awaited post 2020 climate agreement. This article brings different pieces of research...

Our purpose is to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of a Partial Climate Agreement with open entry under a non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium framework. We evaluate a partial agreement policy in which non-signatory countries can decide to join or to leave a coalition of the willing at any...

Our purpose is to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of a Partial Climate Agreement with open entry under a non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium framework. We evaluate a partial agreement policy in which non-signatory countries can decide to join or to leave a coalition of the willing at any...

Given the current stalemate of international negotiations on climate change, with no global agreement at the horizon, we evaluate the possibility of a special partial agreement with only a subset of countries ratifying a treaty. In this framework, the non-signatory countries can decide to join...

Given the current stalemate of international negotiations on climate change, with no global agreement at the horizon, we evaluate the possibility of a special partial agreement with only a subset of countries ratifying a treaty. In this framework, the non-signatory countries can decide to join...

Our purpose is to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of a Partial Climate Agreement with open entry under a non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium framework. We evaluate a partial agreement policy in which non-signatory countries can decide to join or to leave a coalition of the willing at any...

Our purpose is to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of a Partial Climate Agreement with open entry under a non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium framework. We evaluate a partial agreement policy in which non-signatory countries can decide to join or to leave a coalition of the willing at any...