Mechanisms according to which private intermediaries or governments charge transaction fees or indirect taxes are prevalent in practice. We consider a setup with multiple buyers and sellers and two-sided independent private information about valuations. We show that any weighted average of...

This paper estimates the cost of using simple percentage fees rather than the broker optimal Bayesian mechanism, using data for real estate transactions in Boston in the mid-1990s. This counterfactual analysis shows that interme- diaries using the best percentage fee mechanisms with fees ranging...

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...

It is well known that non-renegotiable contracts with third parties may have an effect on the outcome of a strategic interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of twostage games...

Mechanisms according to which private intermediaries or governments charge transaction fees or indirect taxes are prevalent in practice. We consider a setup with multiple buyers and sellers and two-sided independent private information about valuations. We show that any weighted average of...

Mechanisms where sellers set the price and are charged a linear commission fee are widely used by real world intermediaries, e.g. by real estate brokers. Empirically these commission fees exhibit very little variance, both across heterogeneous regional markets and over time. So far, there is no...

We investigate a model in which a monopoly supplier distributes two types of its product through a traditional retailer with a wholesale price contract and an online retailer with an agency contract. Because such an agency contract eliminates the double marginalization problem, the online...

It is well known that non-renegotiable contracts with third parties may have an effect on the outcome of a strategic interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of twostage games...

Mechanisms where sellers set the price and are charged a linear commission fee are widely used by real world intermediaries, e.g. by real estate brokers. Empirically these commission fees exhibit very little variance, both across heterogeneous regional markets and over time. So far, there is no...

Mechanisms according to which private intermediaries or governments charge transaction fees or indirect taxes are prevalent in practice. We consider a setup with multiple buyers and sellers and two-sided independent private information about valuations. We show that any weighted average of...