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A buyer with downward sloping demand faces a number of unit supply sellers. The paper characterizes optimal auctions in this setting. For the symmetric case, a uniform auction (with price equal to lowest rejected offer) is optimal when complemented with reserve prices for different quantities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547383
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604844
A buyer with downward slopping demand faces a number of unit supply sellers. The paper characterizes optimal auctions in this setting. For the symmetric case, a uniform auction (with price equal to lowest rejected offer) is optimal when complemented with reserve prices for different quantities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325018
This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792157
A buyer with downward slopping demand faces a number of unit supply sellers. The paper characterizes optimal auctions in this setting. For the symmetric case, a uniform auction (with price equal to lowest rejected offer) is optimal when complemented with reserve prices for different quantities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385465
A buyer with downward slopping demand faces a number of unit supply sellers. The paper characterizes optimal auctions in this setting. For the symmetric case, a uniform auction (with price equal to lowest rejected offer) is optimal when complemented with reserve prices for different quantities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607130
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155434
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378562
We consider discriminatory auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly for multiple units. None of the usual assumptions about symmetry of players' distributions over values or of their equilibrium play are made. Because of this, equilibria will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824517
How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment? We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers’...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827466