Electronic commerce and flexible manufacturing allow personalization of initially standardized products at low cost. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyze how his decision...

We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally sufficiently informed about their preferences, e.g., about their future demand for a utility such as electricity or telecommunication. When more consumers become informed, we show that this benefits...

We examine the design of nonlinear prices by a multiproduct monopolist who serves customers with multidimensional but correlated types. We show that the monopoly can exploit the correlations between consumers' types to design pricing mechanisms that fully extract the surplus from each consumer....

We address the question of designing dynamic menus to sell experience goods. A dynamic menu consists of a set of price-quantity pairs in each period. The quality of the product is initially unknown, and more information is generated through experimentation. The amount of information in the...

We consider a dynamic posted-price mechanism of a seller who must sell a single unit of a good to a number of buyers before a deadline. The seller cannot pre-commit to any price-path. Even when the buyers are symmetric (though non-anonymous) to the seller, the seller can charge different prices...

A data broker sells market segmentations created by consumer data to a producer with private production cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers with heterogeneous values. In this setting, I completely characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. In particular,...

Consumer surplus in a market is affected by how the market is segmented. We study the maximum consumer surplus across all possible segmentations of a given market served by a multi product monopolist. We characterize markets for which the maximum consumer surplus equals a first best benchmark...

I study a model that looks at causes, characteristics and consequences of loyalty schemes in a market with consumers who suffer from self-control problems (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001). While the literature has mostly focused on loyalty schemes as tools used by firms to compete (Caminal and...

Product information websites have become ubiquitous in supporting B2C E-Commerce. This paper explores their impact on firm profitability, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Using an analytical model, we show that firms take advantage of such infomediaries and reduce their own information...

When luxury purchases signal the incomes of buyers, a monopoly will deliver signals efficiently. If in contrast competitors sell counterfeit copies of luxury goods at low prices, consumers will have to buy larger quantities or higher qualities to transmit the same signals, which wastes...