voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee "impatience"). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and …

; experiments ; divide-the-dollar ; committees … voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee "impatience"). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and …

experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and … each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes …

experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and … each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes …

decreasing in disagreement values. We conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule, finding …

decreasing in disagreement values. We conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule, finding …

experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and … dictatorship (q=1). -- Dynamic political economy ; voting ; public goods ; bargaining ; experiments … each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes …