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Faulty Nash Implementation in Exchange Economies withSingle-peaked Preferences

Doghmi, Ahmed; Ziad, Abderrahmane - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerantimplementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of thek-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022175

Collectively Ranking Candidates– An Axiomatic Approach

Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2011

Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates since theycare more or less for the various qualities of the candidates. It is assumed that allevaluators submit vector bids assigning a monetary bid for each possible rank order.The rules must specify for all possible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248888

Pro t-Maximizing Matchmaker

Yu Ko, Chiu; Konishi, Hideo - Boston College / Department of Economics - 2009

This paper considers a matchmaker game in the Shapley-Shubik(1971) (one-to-one) assignment problem. Each rm proposes how muchit is willing to pay each worker if they are matched. Each worker alsoproposes which salary she is willing to accept from each rm if they arematched. The matchmaker...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302542

INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES IN A STRATEGICSETTING: THE 3-POINTS-FOR-A-WIN SYSTEM INSOCCER

Moschini, GianCarlo - Iowa State University of Science and Technology <Ames, … - 2008

I exploit a major structural change that has occurred in world soccer to study the impact ofincentives on outcomes in a strategic setting. A game-theoretic model is developed thatcaptures some essential strategic elements of soccer vis-à-vis the number of points awardedto a win. The observable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360784

Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics:The Continous Strategy Case

Hofbauer, Josef; Oechssler, Jörg; Riedel, Frank - Alfred-Weber-Institut für Sozial- und … - 2005

In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria basedon Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous—time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier byBrown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently beensuggested as a plausible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868464

Organizational structure and innovative activity

Sliwka, Dirk - 2003

A model is analyzed in which agents exert effort to create innovations within an organization. When payments are infeasible, the decision on the implementation of a proposal is shown to bemadeby simplemonotonic decision rules. A trade-off arises between the use of information and the incentives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845884

Public governance of central banks: an approach from new institutional economics

Oritani, Yoshiharu - Bank für Internationalen Zahlungsausgleich <Basel> - 2010

wirft auf die öffentliche Verwaltung der Zentralbanken. Erstens Williamson's Theorie der "Governance als Unversehrtheit …" (Rechtschaffenheit) ist die interne Verwaltung der Zentralbanken angewendet. Moe's Theorie der "öffentlichen Bürokratie" ist das Konzept … der Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank angewandt. Zweitens wenden wir Agency-Theorie, die... …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870975

House Allocation with Overlapping Agents: A DynamicMechanism Design Approach

Kurino, Morimitsu - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, inthe case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move inand graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A studentis a \newcomer" in the beginning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022173

Motivational Cherry Picking

Regner, Tobias; Riener, Gerhard - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2011

We construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustorhas the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisionseither sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248883

Procedurally Fair Provision of Public ProjectsAn axiomatic characterization

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2011

Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants vetopower to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of biddingprocesses to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a“productive state”. At heart...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248891

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