In this note, we characterize the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes, as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal [1983. A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice. 41, 7-53]

We analyse a standard pivotal-voter model under majority rule, with two rival groups of players, each preferring one of two public policies and simultaneously deciding whether to cast a costly vote, as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). We allow the benefit of the favorite public policy to...

This paper investigates the effect of aggregate-level information shocks regarding support for a populist right-wing party on the individual disposition to report a respective political preference in survey interviews. Despite controversial debates about the social acceptability of its...

The fixed rate tender is one of the main operational formats used by central banks in the implementation of their monetary policies. While academic research has largely dismissed the procedure for its tendency to encourage overbidding, central banks such as the ECB and the Bank of England have...

Previous literature has identified considerable non-pecuniary costs to macroeconomic fluctuation and uncertainty. The present paper investigates whether and to what extent labor market institutions can mitigate those costs. We study how life satisfaction of European citizens is affected by...

Municipalities sometimes retain separate police departments and park services while cooperating in public schooling services with neighboring municipalities. The theoretical model of Ellingsen (1998) predicts that: 1) under Tiebout sorting, larger size differences make big municipalities more...

This paper proposes several statistical tests for finite state Markov games to examine the null hypothesis that the data are generated from a single equilibrium. We formulate tests of (i) the conditional choice probabilities, (ii) the steady-state distribution of states and (iii) the conditional...

This paper considers the e effcts of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...

We establish a theoretical as well as empirical framework to assess the role of resource endowments and their geographic location for inter-State conflict. The main predictions of the theory are that conflict tends to be more likely when at least one country has natural resources; when the...

This paper considers an experimental market entry game, where the decision problem involves several heterogeneous markets and players have an opportunity to enter several markets simultaneously. We find that groups fail to coordinate on any of the multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria by...