It is proved that, among all restricted preference domains that guarantee consistency (i.e. transitivity) of pairwise majority voting, the single-peaked domain is the only minimally rich and connected domain that contains two completely reversed strict preference orders. It is argued that this...

Lalley and Weyl (2016) propose a mechanism for binary collective decisions, Quadratic Voting, and prove its approximate efficiency in large populations in a stylized environment. They motivate their proposal substantially based on its greater robustness when compared with pre-existing efficient...

This paper proposes a way to allocate schools places conciliating Pareto efficiency and Equity. Taking as a starting point the recent reform proposed by the Boston School Committee, we suggest to allow the schools to prioritize only a reduced group of students and use a common priority order for...

In a framework allowing infinitely many individuals, I prove that coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions satisfy tops only. That is, they depend only on which alternative each indvidual prefers the most, not on which alternative she prefers the second most, the third, \dots, or the...

A committee chooses whether to approve a proposal that some members may consider ethical. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, and all pay a cost if the proposal is accepted. Committee members have different depths of reasoning. The model predicts that features that...

We consider the problems of fairly allocating indivisible objects and money. The objective of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy-free solutions. We show that each individual obtains the welfare level of his "optimal" envy-free allocation by maximally manipulating...

In this paper, virtual implementation is restricted so that only a socially optimal outcome or some fixed outcome (a status quo) can be delivered on the equilibrium path. Under such a restriction, any unanimous and implementable social choice function is almost-dictatorial. That is, there is an...

In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerantimplementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of thek-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity and...

We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping generations of agents.It is assumed that the preferences of agents do not change during their lifetime.A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function of the preferences of agents who are alive in that...

We conduct an experiment to uncover the reasons behind the typically large behavioral variation and low explanatory power of Nash equilibrium observed in Tullock contests. In our standard contest treatment, only 7% of choices are consistent with Nash equilibrium which is in line with the...