The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...

This discussion paper resulted in an article in <I>Economics Letters</I> (2007). Vol. 96, pp. 316-324.<P> The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for...</p></i>

There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time preferences. We show that players behave quite differently under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies...

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is...

The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...

There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time preferences. We show that players behave quite differently under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies...