Similar Search Results

Jehiel, P.; Thisse. J.-F. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001

The lobbying process is modelled as an auction with externalities in which lobbies bid to get implemented thei most-prefered policy. Further more, the government may influence the lobbying process itself by biasing the auction among organized interests. We identify the following trade-off :...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478949

Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare

HINDRIKS, Jean; LOCKWOOD, Ben - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005

incumbent can divert rents in some regions without this being detected by voters in other regions (selective rent diversion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043539

Divided Government and Dominance Solvability.

Iannantuoni, G. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

Using the spatial theory of voting, this paper describes an institutional structure where there are two branches of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule, and the legislative elected by proportional rule. The resulting policy outcome is described through a compromise between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634077

Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2006

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching-up. We analyze one channel through which corruption …-seeking. At equilibrium, the intensity of corruption and the structure of public investment are determined by the predatory … without corruption in which there is no effective corruption yet still the possibility of corruption distorts the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008244

Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives and growth

DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public … institutional parameters: the "technology of corruption" is the ease with which rent-seekers can capture a proportion of public … corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043278

The impact of minimum wages on hours and employment revisited

STROBL, Eric; WALSH, Frank - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2004

Using a standard production function the equilibrium hours per worker wage locus is shown to be u-shaped in a competitive labour market. A minimum wage mayth us either increase or decrease hours per worker and, by extension, the number of workers. We provide supporting evidence for this using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008210

Dealing with monopsony power: the case for using employment subsidies

STROBL, Eric; WALSH, Frank - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003

We show in a monopsony model that a minimum wage may raise hours which are already too high but has ambiguous effects on the number of employees and utility. Employment subsidies, in contrast, unambiguously improve worker utility and bring the market equilibrium closer to the efficient outcome.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043266

Estimating the shirking model with variable effort

STROBL, Eric; WALSH, Frank - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003

We show in a theoretical efficiency wage model where firms differ in monitoring intensity or in the effort intensity of their technologies that the impact of monitoring intensity on wages is ambiguous, a result that mirrors evidence from the empirical literature. We argue that to correctly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065382

How Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market Affects Long-Term Unemployment Policies.

Wauthy, X.; Zenou, Y. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1996

We consider a continuum of unemployed workers ranked according to their unemployment duration. There are two industries, a high and a low technology one, which compete imperfectly on the labor market. Once employed, each individual must bear a training cost, which is proportional to his...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634208

Agenda Control in Coalition Formation.

Bloch, F.; Rottier, S. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state in non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478947

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Next
Last