Nash (1950) considered a domain of convex bargaining problems. We analyse domains including, or even consisting of, finite problems and provide various characterisations of the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). In particular, we extend Kaneko's (1980) results

Collective choice problems on sets in ${\frak R}_+^n$ arise naturally in economics. Such problems have been extensively studied both in the theory of revealed preferences (Peters and Wakker, 1991) and in axiomatic bargaining theory under the assumption of convexity. However, our knowledge of...

The Suppes-Sen dominance relation is a weak and widely accepted criterion of distributive justice. I propose its application to Nash bargaining theory. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is characterised by replacing the controversial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom with an axiom...

Collective choice problems on sets in <InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"> ${\frak R}_+^n$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> arise naturally in economics. Such problems have been extensively studied both in the theory of revealed preferences (Peters and Wakker, 1991) and in axiomatic bargaining theory under the assumption of convexity. However, our knowledge of...</equationsource></inlineequation>

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that...

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that...

A characteristic of many bargaining situations is that the negotiators represents the interests of a set of parties (trade unions, political parties, etc.) with composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural...