This paper studies bargaining outcomes in economies in which agents may be able to impose outcomes that deviate from the relevant social norm, but incur costs when they decide to do so. It characterizes bargaining outcomes that are easiest to sustain as a social norm to which everybody will want...

We first show through a counter-example that the existence result of Maskin: Bargaining, coalitions and externalities, Presidential address of the Econometric Society, 2003] does not extend beyond three players.Intuitively, the bargaining may not be able to continue because there may be no...

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of on-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players'...

In this paper, we study the generalized Nash bargaining solution of bilateral bargaining in any given network, which is equivalent to the bilateral balanced outcome of a cooperative game with a network structure. We first establish that it is without loss of generality to focus on any...

Negotiations between buyers and suppliers that require sharing cost details to identify profitable relationship specific investments often fail and result in hold-ups. Based on inequity aversion, strategic uncertainty, and risk dominance criteria, we expect negotiators to be more reluctant to...

This paper offers a historical account of the bargaining theories. It includes (i) the calculation methods for bargaining, (ii) the bargaining theories for benefit, and (iii) the bargaining theory against cost. This paper proves that economists cannot offer any satisfactory solution to these...

This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. We show that when outside options are independent of the actions of other...

This paper studies multilateral negotiations among n players in an environment where there are externalities and where contracts forming coalitions can be written and renegotiated. The negotiation process is modeled as a sequential game of offers and counteroffers, and we focus on the stationary...

This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitions”) deliberately get together to jointly determine within-group actions, while interacting noncooperatively across groups. The chapter describes...

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also covers models of group and network formation by farsighted...