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On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions : Communities and Courts
Prüfer, Jens; Masten, S.E. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2011
ongoing relationship have little incentive to honor deals. Therefore, all economies have developed institutions to support … weakens the effectiveness of community enforcement. By relating the effectiveness of enforcement institutions to changes in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090830
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Economc Ties and Social Dilemmas : An Experimental Study
van Soest, Daan; Vyrastekova, J. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090427
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Strategic vs Non-Strategic Motivations of Sanctioning
Vyrastekova, J.; Funaki, Y.; Takeuchi, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008
We isolate strategic and non-strategic motivations of sanctioning in a repeated public goods game. In two experimental treatments, subjects play the public goods game with the possibility to sanction others. In the STANDARD sanctions treatment, each subject learns about the sanctions received in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090990
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Trust in the Shadow of the Courts
Brennan, G.; Güth, W.; Kliemt, H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1997
If contract enforcers must be randomly selected from the same population and thus are as opportunistic as ordinary traders could a system of adjudication nevertheless increase the degree to which contractual obligations on large anonymous markets are fulfilled? Adopting an indirect evolutionary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091713
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Cost allocation rules for elastic single-attribute situations
Borm, Peter; Karsten, Frank; Slikker, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2015
Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in<br/>queuing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199229
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Methodological Interactionism : Theory and Application to the Firm and to the Building of Trust
Nooteboom, B. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2007
Recent insights from the ‘embodied cognition’ perspective in cognitive science, supported by neural research, provide a basis for a ‘methodological interactionism’ that transcends both the methodological individualism of economics and the methodological collectivism of (some) sociology,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090343
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Ignorance is not always Bliss : Feedback and Dynamics in Public Good Experiments
Suetens, Sigrid; Bigoni, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010
In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions and earnings on the dynamics of contributions in a repeated public good game. We include treatments where subjects can freely choose whether to obtain additional information about individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090656
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Conditional Cooperation : Disentangling Strategic from Non-Strategic Motivations
Suetens, Sigrid; Reuben, E. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008
We use a novel experimental design to examine the role of reputational concerns in explaining conditional cooperation in social dilemmas. By using the strategy method in a repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma in which the probabilistic end is known, we can distinguish between strategically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090822
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Does it take Three to Make Two Happy? An Experimental Study on Bargaining with Mediation
Schroeter, K.; Vyrastekova, J. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003
Mediation is a conflict resolution method in which a third neutral party provides assistance to the conflict parties ….The process of mediation as well as any solution to the conflict arising from it is implemented only by the consent of all … conflict parties.It is the role of a mediator to stimulate communication that leads to mutual understanding of the feasible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090929
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Communication and Guilt in a Prisoner's Dilemma
Suetens, Sigrid; Miettinen, T. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008
In this paper we measure experienced guilt in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment with pre-play communication. We find that feelings of guilt only arise in the case of unilateral defection and that they are stronger when players have mutually agreed to cooperate. We also find that fining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091182