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left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However …, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract as the … optimal contract that integrates unemployment insurance and retirement pension systems. -- Unemployment insurance ; retirement …
left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However …, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract as the … optimal contract that integrates unemployment insurance and retirement pension systems. …
for a job. This is because of the short time-horizon of workers close to retirement. We propose to introduce a pension tax … pension tax allows those workers near retirement who still do not exercise job search to smooth their consumption during their …
-free. Second, the short job duration before retirement implies that the budgetary return and search incentives associated with the …. Finally, even in the special case where search intensity is zero close to retirement, perfect risk-sharing across unemployment … and retirement is welfare-improving thanks to the pension tax. …
left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more decreasing replacement ratio. However …, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract. It is … show that the unemployment benefit agency could take advantage of the retirement period to tax pensions in order to …
an open question. The rich empirical literature on the "retirement consumption paradox" suggests that the rate is below …
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
We study an individual's incentive to search for a job in the presence of random criminal opportunities. These opportunities extenuate moral hazard, as the individual sometimes commits crime rather than searching. Even when he searches, he applies less effort. We then revisit the design of...