The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by …

first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … overt collusion, stable cartels buy at a lower price in EN than in FPSB resulting in a lower average winning bid in EN. …

first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … overt collusion, stable cartels buy at a lower price in EN than in FPSB resulting in a lower average winning bid in EN. …

decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while …

This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop … both reduce collusion and bids. The deterrent effect of debarment increases in its length. However, the debarment of … reduction resulting from debarment may trigger tacit collusion. …

In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator - a …