Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 87
Cover Image
A Numerical Analysis of the Evolutionary Stability of Learning Rules
Josephson, Jens - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2001
In this paper I define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I then … apply this criterion to a class of learning rules that can be represented by Camerer and Ho's (1999) model of learning. This … class contains perturbed versions of reinforcement and belief learning as special cases. A large population of individuals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423816
Cover Image
Transparency and Competition
Nilsson, Arvid - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1999
This paper examines the effects of search costs on prices in a Bertrand duopoly. It is shown that if the search cost is lowered, the expected price goes down in a single play of the stage game. However, if the game is repeated it may be easier to sustain collusion the lower the search cost. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423827
Cover Image
Stochastic Adaptation in Finite Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations
Josephson, Jens - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2001
player role, is drawn to play and chooses a pure strategy according to her personal learning rule after observing a sample …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190858
Cover Image
Stochastic Imitation in Finite Games
Josephson, Jens; Matros, Alexander - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2000
In this paper we model an evolutionary process with perpetual random shocks where individual behavior is determined by imitation. Every period an agent is randomly chosen from each of n finite populations to play a game. Each agent observes a sample of population-specific past strategy and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649201
Cover Image
Price-Wars in Finite Sequential Move Price Competition: The Role of Discounting
Wallner, Klaus - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2000
This paper characterizes the unique Markov equilibrium in the sequential move, finite horizon pricing duopoly with discounting. Simple, short cycles repeat until the last two periods. For discount factors above 0.75488, there are three-period reaction function cycles and below 0.75488,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649351
Cover Image
Stochastic Better-Reply Dynamics in Games
Josephson, Jens - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2000
In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649353
Cover Image
Clever agents in adaptive learning
Matros, Alexander - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2000
agents in general finite two-player games. We show that Young's [9] prediction is robust: adaptive learning with clever …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649382
Cover Image
Efficiency, communication and honesty
Demichelis, Stefano; Weibull, Jörgen - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2006
We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have a lexicographic preference, second to the payoffs in the underlying game, for honesty. We formalize this by way of an honesty (or truth) correspondence between actions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649475
Cover Image
Natural selection and social preferences
Weibull, Jörgen; Salomonsson, Marcus - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2005
A large number of individuals are randomly matched into groups, where each group plays a finite symmetric game. Individuals breed true. The expected number of surviving offspring depends on own material payoff, but may also, due to cooperative breeding and/or reproductive competition, depend on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651518
Cover Image
Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
Viossat, Yannick - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2006
In (Viossat, 2006, "The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria", forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior), it was shown that the replicator dynamics may eliminate all pure strategies used in correlated equilibrium, so that only strategies that do not take part in any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651520