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The Effect of Noise in a Performance Measure on Work Motivation
Sloof, Randolph; Praag, C. Mirjam van - Tinbergen Institute - 2008
performance. Measured performance equals actual performance plus noise. We compare a stable environment where the noise is small … with a volatile environment where the noise is large. Subjects exert significantly more effort in the volatile environment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144498
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Market Power in Water Markets
Ansink, Erik; Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
Water markets with market power are analysed as multi-market Cournot competition in which the river structure constrains access to local markets and limited resources impose capacity constraints. Conditions for uniqueness are identified. Lerner indices are larger under binding resource...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838627
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Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers
Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Institute - 2009
This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects that depend on the rank-order of her decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964456
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Preopening and Equilibrium Selection
Calcagno, Riccardo; Lovo, Stefano - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
We introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call "preopening". During the preopening, players announce their tentative actions to be played in the underlying game. Announcements are made using a posting system which is subject to stochastic failures. Posted actions are publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008484068
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Equilibrium Selection in Games with Macroeconomic Complementarities
Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.; Tieman, Alexander F. - Tinbergen Institute - 1999
We apply the stochastic evolutionary approach of equilibrium selection to macroeconomic models in which a complementarity at the macro level is present. These models often exhibit multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria, and the best response-correspondence of an individual increases with a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136898
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The Unique-lowest Sealed-bid Auction
Houba, Harold; Laan, Dinard van der; Veldhuizen, Dirk - Tinbergen Institute - 2008
Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136936
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Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model
Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Institute - 2007
We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set of its subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, we provide a recursive technique that relies on the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payoffs. When players have different time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137155
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A Numerical Analysis of the Evolutionary Stability of Learning Rules
Josephson, Jens - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2001
In this paper I define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I then … apply this criterion to a class of learning rules that can be represented by Camerer and Ho's (1999) model of learning. This … class contains perturbed versions of reinforcement and belief learning as special cases. A large population of individuals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423816
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Transparency and Competition
Nilsson, Arvid - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1999
This paper examines the effects of search costs on prices in a Bertrand duopoly. It is shown that if the search cost is lowered, the expected price goes down in a single play of the stage game. However, if the game is repeated it may be easier to sustain collusion the lower the search cost. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423827
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Alternating Offers in Economic Environments
Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Institute
The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209433