Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 134
Cover Image
(Anti-) Coordination in Networks
Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, José Gabriel - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008467327
Cover Image
Predicting one Shot Play in 2x2 Games Using Beliefs Based on Minimax Regret
Gallice, Andrea - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
We present a simple procedure that selects the strategies most likely to be played by inexperienced agents who interact in one shot 2x2 matching pennies games. As a first step we axiomatically describe players’ beliefs. We find the minimax regret criterion to be the simplest functional form...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385407
Cover Image
Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games
Mengel, Friederike; Sciubba, Emanuela - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008828406
Cover Image
The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network
Kinateder, Markus - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674329
Cover Image
Stochastic Stability in the Best Shot Game
Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It has generally a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. In this paper we show that, depending on how we define perturbations, i.e. the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674338
Cover Image
Team Formation in a Network
Kinateder, Markus - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project’s quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008038
Cover Image
Special Interests and Technological Change
Bellettini, Giorgio; Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
We study an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources: process innovation and learning …-by-doing. There is a trade-off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing … prefer learning. We model the interaction between overlapping generations and policy makers as a dynamic common agency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423186
Cover Image
Dynamic Price Competition with Price Adjustment Costs and Product Differentiation
Vernasca, Gianluigi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
We study a discrete time dynamic game of price competition with spatially differentiated products and price adjustment costs. We characterise the Markov perfect and the open-loop equilibrium of our game. We find that in the steady state Markov perfect equilibrium, given the presence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423188
Cover Image
Networks with Group Counterproposals
Nieva, Ricardo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008
We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230849
Cover Image
Repeated Games Played in a Network
Kinateder, Markus - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008
Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230891