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Voronoi languages : equilibria in cheap-talk games with high–dimensional types and few signals
Jäger, Gerhard; Koch-Metzger, Lars; Riedel, Frank - 2009
We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921430
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Hierarchical Bayesian Persuasion
Kuang, Zhonghong; Lien, Jaimie W.; Zheng, Jie - 2023
We study a hierarchical Bayesian persuasion game with a sender, a receiver, and several potential intermediaries, generalizing the framework of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). The sender must be persuasive through a hierarchy of intermediaries to reach the final receiver, whose action affects all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014344060
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Communication and Learning
Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2008
perfectly aligned "full learning" equilibria - ones in which the individuals' posterior beliefs eventually place full weight on … message of all his predecessors. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all … mediator who can work across time periods arbitrarily far apart. In this case full learning equilibria exist. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013922
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Communication and Learning
Lagunoff, Roger; Gerardi, Dino; Anderlini, Luca - Georgetown University, Department of Economics - 2008
makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning" equilibria -- ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …. In this case full learning equilibria exist. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169616
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Communication and Learning
Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008
makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning'' equilibria -- ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …. In this case full learning equilibria exist. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593160
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A Laboratory Study of a Multi-Level Trust Game with Communication
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - Department of Economics, McMaster University - 2009
This experimental study explores how communication influences efficiency, trust and trustworthiness in a small group when one member is left out of communication. To study this problem, we introduce a novel three-player trust game where player 1 can send any portion of his endowment to player 2....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528460
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Repeated games played in a network
Kinateder, Markus - 2008
Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270931
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Efficiency, communication and honesty
DeMichelis, Stefano (contributor);  … - 2006 - First draft February 1, 2006, This version: November 28, 2006
We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have a lexicographic preference, second to the payoffs in the underlying game, for honesty. We formalize this by way of an honesty (or truth) correspondence between actions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003393210
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Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection
Jamison, Julian C. - 2012 - This version: January 11, 2012
Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a rationale for expecting Nash equilibrium in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511713
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Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values
Heller, Yuval; Kuzmics, Christoph - 2021
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210917