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Vertical R&D Spillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation

Atallah, Gamal - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2000

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005273027

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures

Atallah, Gamal - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2000

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a three-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing along with R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005838745

A Dynamic Duopoly Investment Game without Commitment under Uncertain Market Expansion

Boyer, Marcel; Lasserre, Pierre; Moreaux, Michel - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2011

We model capacity-building investments in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth. Capacity building is achieved through the addition of production units that are durable and lumpy and whose cost is irreversible. While building their capacity over time, firms compete à la...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009350695

Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European Union

Allain, Marie-Laure; Boyer, Marcel; Kotchoni, Rachidi; … - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2013

framework to characterize the compensation and deterrence properties of fines, based on the fact that cartel stability depends …. We show that the proper consideration of cartel dynamics plays a major role in determining optimal deterrent fines. Our …'un cartel dépend de la capacité à prévenir les déviations, qui elle-même dépend en partie des amendes infligées en cas de …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183779

Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation

Atallah, Gamal - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2005

In this paper we extend the R&D cooperation model to asymmetric firms, focusing on the incentives for cooperating with firms characterized by different levels of efficiency. Three firms differentiated by their cost levels invest in cost-reducing R&D before competing in output. Firms may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005273021

The Protection of Innovations

Atallah, Gamal - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

This paper proposes a model where firms invest in secrecy to limit technological spillovers accruing to their competitors, in addition to investing in cost-reducing R&D. The main result of the paper is that increases in spillovers increase secrecy, suggesting that legal and strategic protection...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169003

Opportunity Costs, Competition, and Firm Selection

Atallah, Gamal - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

The paper questions the standard economic assumptions that competing economic agents have identical reservation utility levels, and that when differences in opportunity costs exit, they can be conveniently represented by fixed costs. Opportunity costs are endogenized by linking them to current...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169017

Banks as Insurance Referral Agents? The Convergence of Financial Services: Evidence from the Title Insurance Industry

Boyer, M. Martin; Nyce, Charles M. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

The purpose of this paper is to offer a glimpse into the potential industrial organization of the property casualty insurance (P&C) market if banks continue to penetrate it at current rates. To do so, we study an insurance market where banks are already integral in distribution: Title insurance....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100522

Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms Under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline

Gagné, Robert; Norden, Simon van; Versaevel, Bruno - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

We analyse the effects of a price floor on price wars in the retail market for gasoline. Our theoretical model assumes a Bertrand oligopoly supergame in which firms initially collude by charging the monopolistic price. Once firms detect a deviation from this strategy, they switch to a lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100529

Bankruptcy Cost, Financial Structure and Technological Flexibility Choices

Boyer, Marcel; Jacques, Armel; Moreaux, Michel - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

We study the interactions between the capital structure and the technological flexibility choices of firms in a duopoly. When there are bankruptcy costs, a leveraged firm may modify its strategic choices in order to decrease its probability of bankruptcy. We show that, when the capacity level of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100547