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Bertrand competition in markets with network effects and switching costs

Suleymanova, Irina (contributor); Wey, Christian (contributor) - 2008

We analyze market dynamics under Bertrand duopoly competition in industries with network effects and consumer switching costs. Consumers form installed bases, repeatedly buy the products, and differ with respect to their switching costs. Depending on the ratio of switching costs to network...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003726117

Supplier fixed costs and retail market monopolization

Caprice, Stéphane; Schlippenbach, Vanessa von; Wey, … - 2014

Considering a vertical structure with perfectly competitive upstream firms that deliver a homogenous good to a differentiated retail duopoly, we show that upstream fixed costs may help to monopolize the downstream market. We find that downstream prices increase in upstream firms' fixed costs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010400592

Mergers in imperfectly segmented markets

Baake, Pio; Wey, Christian - 2009

We present a model with firms selling (homogeneous) products in two imperfectly segmented markets (a "high-demand" and a "low-demand" market). Buyers are mobile but restricted by transportation costs, so that imperfect arbitrage occurs when prices differ in both markets. We show that equilibria...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003874770

A cartel analysis of the German labor institutions and its implications for labor market reforms

Haucap, Justus (contributor); Pauly, Uwe (contributor); … - 2006

In this paper we apply standard cartel theory to identify the major institutional stabilizers of Germany's area tariff … system of collective bargaining between a single industry union and the industry's employers association. Our cartel analysis … stabilize the labor cartel while other pro-competitive proposals have failed. We argue that the pro-competitive recommendations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003411719

Buyer power and supplier incentives

Inderst, Roman (contributor); Wey, Christian (contributor) - 2005

This paper argues that - in contrast to an often expressed view - the formation of larger and more powerful buyers need not reduce welfare by stifling suppliers' incentives. If contracts are determined in bilateral negotiations, the presence of larger buyers may both increase suppliers'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002556787