strategy for the firm is not to be represented. -- litigation ; lawyers ; labour dispute resolution ; prisoner's dilemma … litigation costs and allow us to compute the pay-off matrix. We do not find evidence of a prisoner's dilemma, given that the …

litigation costs and allow us to compute the pay-off matrix. We do not find evidence of a prisoner’s dilemma, given that the …

litigation costs and allow us to compute the pay-off matrix. We do not find evidence of a prisoner’s dilemma, given that the …

We present a model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers in their divorce process. Spouses encounter … incentives as in the classical prisoners' dilemma: Despite the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers' fees, each spouse has … an incentive to hire a lawyer. We propose a simple institutional setting allowing for joint lawyers in order to overcome …

, on the length of the divorce process and on the quality of the divorce settlement. -- litigation ; lawyers ; divorce …We present a model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers in their divorce process. Spouses encounter … incentives as in the classical prisoners' dilemma: Despite the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers' fees, each spouse has …

We present a model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers in their divorce process. Spouses encounter … incentives as in the classical prisoners' dilemma: Despite the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers' fees, each spouse has … an incentive to hire a lawyer. We propose a simple institutional setting allowing for joint lawyers in order to overcome …

slowly evolved to a non-cooperative equilibrium where the use of lawyers becomes nearly universal, despite the fact that … agreeing not to hire lawyers is cheaper and does not appear to alter arbitration outcomes. …

We present a model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers in their divorce process. Spouses encounter … incentives as in the classical prisoners’ dilemma: Despite the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers’ fees, each spouse has … an incentive to hire a lawyer. We propose a simple institutional setting allowing for joint lawyers in order to overcome …

We present a model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers in their divorce process. Spouses encounter … incentives as in the classical prisoners’ dilemma: Despite the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers’ fees, each spouse has … an incentive to hire a lawyer. We propose a simple institutional setting allowing for joint lawyers in order to overcome …