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Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

EHLERS, Lars - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2005

The following properties of the core of a one-to-one matching problem are well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii … literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result …) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671545

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2010

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671538

(Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2012

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616511

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants : A Mechanism Design Approach

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2014

This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010894988

An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-Linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2013

We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927904

An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method

SPRUMONT, Yves - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2010

We offer an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should pay less.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617052

Sharing a River among Satiable Countries

AMBEC, Stefan; EHLERS, Lars - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2006

With diminishing global water reserves the problem of water allocation becomes increasingly important. We consider the problem of efficiently sharing a river among a group of satiable countries. Inducing countries to efficiently cooperate requires monetary compensations via international...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617059

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

SPRUMONT, Yves - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2004

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671572

Adaptation and the Allocation of Pollution Reduction Costs

Benchekroun, Hassan; Taherkhani, Farnaz - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2013

We consider a game of abatement of a transboundary pollutant. We use a time-consistent Shapley value allocation of the cost of pollution reduction, and study the sensitivity of such an allocation to countries' adaptation to pollution. A country's adaptation to pollution is captured by a change...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010660248

A Characterization of Exact Non-atomic Market Games

AMARANTE, Massimiliano - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2013

Continuous exact non-atomic games are naturally associated to certain operators between Banach spaces. It thus makes sense to study games by means of the corresponding operators. We characterize non-atomic exact market games in terms of the properties of the associated operators. We also prove a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927911