We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set … of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core … generate as strict extensions all the (complete) preference profiles with the same Core. This is important for applications …

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain …. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that … yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to …

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of … college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking …