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Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching

Vannetelbosch, Vincent; Mauleon, Ana; Vergote, Wouter - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann … set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets … show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965189

The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; Young, H. Peyton - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no … sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665513

Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any … definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090

Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options

Bloch, Francis; Gomes, Armando - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385394

Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems

Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385430

Finding Maxmin Allocations in Cooperative and Competitive Fair Division

Dall'Aglio, Marco; Luca, Camilla Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421244

Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation

Kilgour, Marc; Brams, Steven J. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008013

A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin

Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423099

Free Trade Networks

Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider a general n-country model in which countries trade differentiated industrial commodities as well as a numeraire good. Countries may be different in the size of the industrial good industry...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423216

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process –...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423226