cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable … sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus …

when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann … set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets … show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences. …

existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept to a matching-based Cournot model in which the unit production cost … technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational … marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching. However, if the substitutive …

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly … dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this … von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate …

when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann … set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets … show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences …

cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable … sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus …

cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable … sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus …

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through … are currently employed/unemployed. We show that such a process is absorbed into the core with probability one in finite … time. Moreover, within the core, allocations are selected that are characterized by surplus splitting according to a …