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Coalition and Core in Resource Allocation and Exchange
Zhang, Jun - 2020
In discrete exchange economies with possibly redundant and joint ownership, we propose new core notions in the …-enforcing coalitions and to redistribute their redundant property rights. Our first notion lies between the strong core and the weak core … and is independent of Balbuzanov and Kotowski's (2019a) exclusion core. Our second notion refines the first and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839675
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On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
Haake, Claus-Jochen (contributor);  … - 2007
Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731672
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Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186
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A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions
Dimitrov, Dinko (contributor);  … - 2006
models, Shenoy's (1979) absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions provides a sufficient condition for core existence. We …. (2001) that guarantees nonemptiness of the core in more general models. As it turns out, the top coalition property implies … induced hedonic game satisfies the top coalition property. -- Coalition formation ; Core ; Paradox of smaller coalitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731198
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Coalitional Stability in Matching Problems with Externalities and Random Preferences
Piazza, Adriana; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo - 2021
We study coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities, including marriage markets, roommate problems … matching. In this context, if agents have a limited capacity to organize themselves into large coalitions, then coalitional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013313691
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Chapter 9 Representative democracy as social choice
Schofield, Norman - In: Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 1, (pp. 425-455). 2002
Social Choice traditionally employs the preferences of voters or agents as primitives. However, in most situations of constitutional decision-making the beliefs of the members of the electorate determine their secondary preferences or choices. Key choices in US political history, such as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023834
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Cost Sharing in a Job Scheduling Problem
Mishra, Debasis; Rangarajan, Bharath - 2007
A set of jobs need to be served by a server which can serve only one job at a time. Jobs have processing times and incur waiting costs (linear in their waiting time). The jobs share their costs through compensation using monetary transfers. In the first part, we provide an axiomatic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026948
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Chapter Fifteen. Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures
Hammond, Peter J. - In: Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 2, (pp. 47-151). 2011
A competitive market mechanism is a prominent example of a nonbinary social choice rule, typically defined for a special class of economic environments in which each social state is an economic allocation of private goods, and individuals’ preferences concern only their own personal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025193
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Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions
Lange, Fabien; Kóczy, László Á. - 2012
A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494516
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Preferences, actions and voting rules
Artabe, Alaitz; Laruelle, Annick; Valenciano, Federico - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 15-28
In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317141