Medicare has recently experienced the largest expansion of benefits since its in- ception: the inclusion of prescription drug coverage under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003. The policy debate has mainly focused on estimating the cost of implementing the...

Over the last two decades, bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model where banks can originate loans, earn their fee, and then sell them off to investors who desire such exposures. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold...

Two complementary sources of information are studied in a multiperiod agency model. One is an accounting source which partially but credibly conveys the agent’s private information through accounting recognition. The other is an unverified communication by the agent (i.e., a self-report). In a...

Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from information asymmetry. Although theorists have attempted to explain the success of Joint Liability Lending (JLL) schemes in mitigating moral hazard, empirical studies are rare. This paper...

The twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are often blamed for the lack of insurance for many fruits and vegetables. This paper develops an alternative method of testing for adverse selection that uses a two-stage approach to determine the effects of technical inefficiency on the...

Cooperative formation in agriculture sometimes occurs in response to the exit of a private firm and typically requires substantial equity investment by participating farmers. What economic rationale can explain why farmers are willing to contribute capital to an activity that (apparently) fails...

Achieving high compliance rates in incentive-based agri-environmental schemes is animportant issue. This paper explores the use of a mixed penalty-reward approach underheterogeneous compliance costs. Specifically, we examine the use of a “compliancereward” under asymmetric information and...

Theoretical research argues that convertible bonds mitigate the contracting costs of moral hazard, adverseselection, and financial distress. Using firm-specific and macroeconomic factors of the contracting costs,we examine the extent to which they impact the likelihood of issuance and the...

We analyze whether fluctuation in economy-wide factors cause time-series variation in thecontracting costs of moral hazard, adverse selection, and financial distress, and so create windows ofopportunity for firms to issue debt. Using the announcement period abnormal returns as one measure of...