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On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods
Bierbrauer, Felix - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009
The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008567935
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An incomplete contracts perspective on the provision and pricing of excludable public goods
Bierbrauer, Felix - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010
We study whether a firm that produces and sells access to an excludable public good should face a self-financing requirement, or, alternatively, receive subsidies that help to cover the cost of public-goods provision. The main result is that the desirability of a self-financing requirement is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008536043
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Optimal Income Taxation and Public-Goods Provision with Preference and Productivity Shocks
Bierbrauer, Felix - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010
shocks. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008462293
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Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants' contributions can only depend on the level of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535928
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Public-Good Provision in a Large Economy
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010
on a mechanism design approach that involves a requirement of coalition-proofness, as well as a requirement of robustness …, so that the mechanism must not depend on specific assumptions about individual beliefs. Our main result shows that such a … mechanism can condition only on the population shares of people with valuations above and below the per capita provision costs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008497629
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Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2008
preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is … system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772748
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Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2006
use a mechanism design approach to solve for the optimal utilitarian provision rule. The relevant incentive constraints …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772800
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Distortionary Taxation and the Free-Rider Problem
Bierbrauer, Felix - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2006
This paper derives a version of the Samuelson rule, which takes not only the marginal costs of public funds into account but also the desirability of preference revelation. Under a linear income tax more able individuals suffer from a larger utility loss if taxes are raised to cover the cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633211
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Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy
Bierbrauer, Felix - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2005
This paper combines the problem of optimal income taxation with the free-rider problem in public good provision. There are two groups of individuals with private information on their earning ability and their valuation of a public good. Adjustments of the transfer system are needed to discourage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772770
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Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems
Bierbrauer, Felix - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2006
This paper assumes that individuals possess private information both about their abilities and about their valuation of a public good. Individuals can undertake collective actions on order to manipulate the tax system and the decision on public good provision. Consequently, an implementable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772789