Similar Search Results

Creating an efficient culture of cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Williams, Tony - 2017

Throughout human history, informal sanctions by peers were ubiquitous and played a key role in the enforcement of social norms and the provision of public goods. However, a considerable body of evidence suggests that informal peer sanctions cause large collateral damage and efficiency costs....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011760106

Creating an efficient culture of cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Williams, Tony - 2017 - Current version: October 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011741750

Social norms, endogenous sorting and the culture of cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Williams, Tony - 2018

Throughout human history, informal sanctions by peers were ubiquitous and played a key role in the enforcement of social norms and the provision of public goods. However, a considerable body of experimental evidence suggests that informal peer sanctions cause large collateral damage and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011825357

Social norms, endogenous sorting and the culture of cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Williams, Tony - 2018

Throughout human history, informal sanctions played a key role in the enforcement of social norms and the provision of public goods. However, a considerable body of evidence suggests that informal peer sanctions often cause large efficiency costs. This raises the question whether alternative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844819

Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment

Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon; Fehr, Ernst - 2001

We study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method. We find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50 percent are conditional cooperators

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171100

Appropriating the commons : a theoretical explanation

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001

In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398786

The dynamics of norm formation and norm decay

Fehr, Ernst; Schurtenberger, Ivo - 2018

Social norms are a ubiquitous feature of social life and pervade almost every aspect of human social interaction. However, despite their importance we still have relatively little empirical knowledge about the forces that drive the formation, the maintenance and the decay of social norms. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011854858

A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence

Falkinger, Josef; Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon; … - 2000

This paper presents an experimental examination of the Falkinger (1996) mechanism for overcoming the free-rider problem …. The basic idea of the mechanism is that deviations from the mean contribution to the public good are taxed and subsidized …. The mechanism has attractive properties because (i) it induces higher contributions to the public good and can implement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205731

A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence

Falkinger, Josef; Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon; … - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205732

Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments

Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon - 2001

This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from the group standard the more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160643

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last